FACTS:
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila , for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines . It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order dated August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged teleconferencing should be given judicial notice so that the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo, to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, claimed to be given in the said meeting via teleconferencing is valid?
HELD:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing – television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing – printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines . Even the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondent’s Manila Regional Office.
KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea . The court granted the motion per its Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. It was on the said date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the assailed resolution:
The respondent’s allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea , only to allege later that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate dated January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City , Branch 163. On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City , filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.
Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.
Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found.[ Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section. On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig , where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative.
What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:
4. That upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent Process Server of RTC, [Branch] 163, Pasig City , from which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated. Disguising myself as accused-appellant Lagua’s relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC, Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora Valdez did not report for work that day, according to Baby (also known as Ester), her officemate (who) answered my call. She added that Rhodora Valdez has been waiting for us (Lagua’s relatives) to call. Her exact words were these: “Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang siyang nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh. Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.”
5. That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text her process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries, to which she answered in the affirmative. While she was in the office, she texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he was on his way back to Quezon City . That was before 4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.
6. That I got Salud’s mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I represented myself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:
1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. – Nov. 2003, 15:36:15
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47
3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21
4. TAWAG K S AKIN – 639204439082 – 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47
5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO – 639204439082-7 Nov 2003 19:44:52
6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05
7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit cino. Lito – 639184470111–7 Nov. 2003 19:54:20
8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:37:57
9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:56:31
10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:52:58
11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 20:57:10
12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman – 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41
13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28
14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo – 639184470111, 7 Nov 2003 21:07:23
15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19
16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas – 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05
17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52
18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24
19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB – 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32
20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13
21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16
22. A , OK , NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 15:12:14
23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03
7. That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did he need to call me up?
8. That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.
9. That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Lagua’s relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Lagua’s release. She refused to entertain me because according to her, “Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud.” Then, she [hung] up.
10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua’s relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellant’s counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex “C”.
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, “Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.”
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office which has nothing to do with cases. Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent and requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an administrative investigation and disciplinary action.
In his counter-affidavit, the respondent vehemently denied the charges. He never demanded money from Lagua’s relative; his name had been used by someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. The investigation was conducted and it was found out that the respondent was guilty as charged, and the recommendation was (1) suspension for 1 year be imposed on the respondent and (2) the case may now be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against Salud constitutes a violation of his right to privacy?
HELD:
Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,[and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof … .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money to “facilitate” the issuance of the appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the surrounding circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in his testimony, point towards administrative culpability. The respondent’s actuations fall short of the standard required of a public servant. He is guilty of gross or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior, while “gross,” has been defined as “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.” Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave offense. However, considering that the respondent has not been previously charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose of disciplining the respondent.
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon them as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. Thus, any conduct which tends to diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be countenanced.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year and Six (6) Months, effective immediately. He is further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The Office of the Court Administrator is also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on the possible involvement of Rhodora Valdez (Utility Worker), and other personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City , Branch 163.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits “A” to “V” together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits “A”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “H” and its sub-markings, “I”, “J” and its sub-markings, “K”, “L”, “M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O”, “P” and its sub-markings, “Q” and its sub-markings, “R” and “S” and its sub-markings. The Court ruled that the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Upon denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits “A”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “H” and its sub-markings, “I”, “J” and its sub-markings, “K”, “L”, “M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O”, “P” and its sub-markings, “Q” and its sub-markings, “R”, and “S” and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photocopies as formally offered are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence?
HELD:
An “electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
The rules use the word “information” to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits “A”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “H” and its sub-markings, “I”, “J” and its sub-markings, “K”, “L”, “M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O”, “P” and its sub-markings, “Q” and its sub-markings, and “R”. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
“SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole.”
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, -versus- ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent. (A.M. No. CA-05-18-P April 12, 2005)
FACTS:
Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time, but respondent did not listen. Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision. Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision.
Complainant lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint for extortion against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, the place where the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place. During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later. When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was pending. She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.
Complainant and respondent negotiated for almost one hour. Complainant bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
Respondent’s apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG (Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee). The Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondent’s case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was the policeman who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued a Resolution dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondent’s preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against her. On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the text messages are admissible in evidence?
HELD:
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainant’s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter’s demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter ofImbestigador who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties’ actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondent’s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondent’s own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
The claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have simply refused to answer the latter’s messages and calls. This she did not do. She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances. But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this way.
By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the people’s confidence in it.
In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Committee in their Report recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
Finding the Committee’s recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong’s evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible in evidence as such?
HELD:
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.”
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.”We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E” and “F”), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the award of actual damages is DELETED. However, petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL DAMAGES in the amount of P200,000.00, and theATTORNEY’S FEES as awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Complainant Lourdes S. Escalona (Escalona) filed on 22 January 2007 a complaint charging respondent Consolacion S. Padillo (Padillo), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 260, Parañaque City with Grave Misconduct. Escalona claimed that she approached Jun Limcaco (Limcaco), the president of their homeowners’ association, regarding her problem with Loresette Dalit (Dalit). Limcaco referred her to Padillo to help facilitate the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision. Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000. After two weeks, Escalona gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutor’s Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Hence, this complaint.
Meanwhile, Escalona withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance dated 10 July 2007 alleging that Padillo already returned to her theP20,000. This notwithstanding, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock sent two notices to Padillo requiring her to submit her comment to the complaint of Escalona. Despite the registry return receipts showing that she received the communications sent to her, Padillo failed to comment on the complaint. On 15 September 2008, this Court required Padillo to explain why she should not be administratively dealt with for her failure to submit the required comment and reiterated the directive on Padillo to submit her comment to Escalona’s complaint. A copy of the resolution sent to Padillo at the RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City was returned unserved with the notation “no longer connected.”
The parties were likewise required to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Copies of the resolution sent to Escalona at B17-L36 Barnabas St., Annex 35, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City and to Padillo at 651 San Francisco St., Las Piñas City were returned unserved with the notation “moved, left no address.”
The Court Administrator, in his Memorandum dated 8 December 2009, found Padillo guilty of grave misconduct for soliciting money from Escalona in exchange for facilitating the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillo’s act of soliciting money from Escalona is an offense which merited the grave penalty of dismissal from the service. However, considering that Padillo tendered her resignation on 18 February 2007, a month after the complaint was filed but did not and has not filed any claim relative to the benefits due her, the Court Administrator recommended that all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, be forfeited and that she be disqualified from reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Padillo is guilty of Grave Misconduct?
HELD:
There is no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona P20,000 purportedly “for fiscal & judge” and “for warrant officer” and this amount was “intended to facilitate” the case against Dalit. This is shown in the receipt signed by Padillo herself.
Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel provides that “(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.” Section 52 (A)(11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service also provides that dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation even if it is the first offense. Section 58(a) of the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
Escalona submitted an Affidavit of Desistance alleging that the P20,000 was “refunded” to her and this she “voluntarily accepted” in the presence of Florante Gaerlan, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 119, Pasay City and Erlinda Dineros, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City. However, even Escalona’s affidavit of desistance will not absolve Padillo from administrative liability. We have always held that the withdrawal of the complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint. This Court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of its officials and employees and in ensuring at all times the proper delivery of justice to the people. No affidavit of desistance can divest this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring officials and employees of the judiciary. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainant’s whims. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel. The people, whose faith and confidence in their government and its instrumentalities need to be maintained, should not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who, in a real sense, are only witnesses. Administrative actions are not made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. Such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Consolacion S. Padillo GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, her retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED. Her civil service eligibility is CANCELLED and she is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED for reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. Based on the CIU’s investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal. On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty. Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders. On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him. On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner’s complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR’s decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner’s appeal. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied thus prompting petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC. On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit for failure of petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner’s claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR’s Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed resolution revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of PAGCOR’s Office of Board of Directors. The CA found baseless and conjectural petitioner’s claim that PAGCOR can easily deny having received the letter by giving orders to their employees to execute an affidavit of denial under pain and threat of administrative sanction or termination from service. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC’s dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
HELD:
A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner’s letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are “electronic data messages” or “electronic documents” within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act.
We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA when it affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits on September 14, 2007. The CSC treated the complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR’s dismissal of petitioner. Under Section 43 which we earlier quoted, petitioner had 15 days from receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his appeal. However, at the time petitioner filed his complaint with the CSC, which was considered as petitioner’s appeal, 41 days had already elapsed from the time he received his letter of dismissal on August 4, 2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since petitioner’s dismissal had already attained finality. Petitioner’s dismissal from the service became final and executory after he failed to file his motion for reconsideration or appeal in the manner and within the period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, Petitioner, – versus – THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, Respondents.
X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, Petitioners, – versus – THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Respondent.
X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, Petitioner-in-Intervention.
X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, Respondents-Intervenors.
X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
(G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008)
FACTS:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, “Tale of Two Tapes,” and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged “original” tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the “Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, “The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness.” In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public “the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s” of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in the internet of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is sufficient?
HELD:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the “Hello Garci” tapes.
FACTS:
The parties to this case are employees of the Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU). Petitioner Teresita G. Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper while respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is the municipal assessor.
The instant case stemmed from three cases of sexual harassment filed separately against respondent by petitioner along with Mary Gay P. de la Cruz and Zenaida M.Gayaton, who are also employees of the LGU.
In her affidavit-complaint, De la Cruz claimed that, sometime in February 2000, respondent handed her a note saying, “Gay, I like you.” Offended by respondent’s inappropriate remark, de la Cruz admonished him for giving her such a note and told him that she would give the note to his wife. Respondent then grabbed the note from her and tore it into pieces. However, this first incident was followed by a message sent to De la Cruz sometime in March 2002 in which he said, “Ka date ko si Mary Gay… ang tamis nghalik mo.”
On the other hand, Gayaton narrated that, on April 5, 2002, respondent whispered to her during a retirement program, “Oy flawless, pumanaw ka met ditan” while twice pinching her upper left arm near the shoulder in a slow manner.
A few days later, Gayaton received a text message while she was passing respondent’s car in front of the municipal hall. The message said, “Pauwi ka na ba sexy?”Gayaton later verified through respondent’s clerk, Alona Agas, that the sender of the message was respondent.
On or about April 22 to 25, 2002, Gayaton received several messages from respondent stating: (1) “I like you”; (2) “Have a date with me”; (3) “Don’t tell to (sic)others that I told that I like you because nakakahiya”; (4) “Puso mo to pag bigay moto sakin, I would be very happy” and (5) “I slept and dreamt nice things about you.”
Finally, as far as petitioner’s complaint was concerned, she asserted that, on November 18, 2000, during a field trip of officers and members of the St. Joseph Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the Grotto Vista Resort in Bulacan, respondent pulled her towards him and attempted to kiss her. Petitioner resisted and was able to escape the clutches of respondent to rejoin the group that they were travelling with. Respondent apologized to petitioner thrice regarding that incident.
Based on the investigation conducted by the LGU’s Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI), respondent was found guilty of all three charges by Municipal Mayor Marvic S. Padilla. For the offenses committed against De la Cruz and Gayaton, respondent was meted the penalties of reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and 30 days’ suspension for his first offense of less grave sexual harassment. His transgression against petitioner, however, was deemed to be grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed from the government service.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) passed only on the decision in the case filed by petitioner since, under the CSC rules, the penalty of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than 30 days cannot be appealed. The CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor Padilla’s order by holding respondent guilty of grave misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment. The same penalty of dismissal from the service, however, was meted out to respondent.
Respondent’s next recourse was to the CA which partially granted his appeal. The CA modified the CSC resolution, finding respondent guilty only of simple misconduct. Accordingly, the penalty was lowered to suspension for one month and one day.
Petitioner comes to this Court to appeal the downgrading of respondent’s offense to simple misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether OR NOT the acts committed by respondent against petitioner (since the CSC resolution only touched upon petitioner’s complaint) constitute simple misconduct or grave misconduct.
HELD:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 031176 issued by the Civil Service Commission finding respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. guilty of grave misconduct is REINSTATED. Respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This is without prejudice to any criminal complaints that may be filed against him.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became “on-and-off” sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his message to which Irish replied asking him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed an information against Rustan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
During the trial, the prosecutor presented the pictures in evidence. The RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner, and therefore ruled that Rustan is guilty of violating Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration, thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?
HELD:
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008 .
SO ORDERED.
cheen421 